This article examines Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum, which Deleuze essential Platonic distinction, Deleuze argues, is more profound than the. Deleuze’s essay Plato and Simulacrum attempts to reverse the the Platonic influence dominating in the philosophy/sophistry dichotomy. How might we. The Simulacrum according to Gilles Deleuze By George Konstantinidis Some was the dream of Deleuze’s cinema books.1 According to Deleuze, in Plato’s.

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How might we experience something and yet call some aspect of that experience false? Sophists adopt relativism to handle the problem – overturned gillrs only seems paradoxical because we are bound to subjective perspective; as perspective changes truth changes. Where the Sophists try to legitimize conflicting views a belief and its contrary are truePlato tries to legitimize only one view.

The argument is then over legitimacy and who has authority.

Deleuze points out that the domain of this contented authority is the realm of similarity and difference. To see where the Sophists and Plato disagree in their values of similarity and difference, it is necessary to see the discrimination in action, at the level of the arguments’ structures. Plato and the Sophists are alike in their structure sijulacrum explaining truth, through a triad of the “Unparticipated”, participated, and participant. The Unparticipated has a primary status in relation to the participated, whereas the participant is related to the participated only secondarily because it must go through the authority of the Unparticipated.

Deleuze gives analogy to this triad by the image of the Father, the daughter, and the fiance. The Sophists fulfill this triad with the Subject, truth, and appearance, while Plato fulfills the triad with the Forms, truth, and instantiations.

Beyond Representation: Plato, Deleuze and the Simulacra

The struggle between the authorities of the Subject and the Forms is made clear through an evaluation of the role that both instantiations and appearance play: Instantiations and appearances play the role of the imminent; we confront the appearance of a thing in confronting the thing, we confront the instantiation of a thing in confronting its Form.

The role of the thf, here as the participant, stands to be judged by the Unparticipated. For gillfs Sophist, the appearance of a thing contains the truth as far as the Subject allows.

For Plato, the instance of a thing is true insofar as it corresponds to the Forms. But what should compel a person to choose either side of this authority struggle? Bias in the primacy of releuze over difference causes Plato to stick with the Forms.

We can see that the participant in both triads is a copybut each participant is a special kind of copy. For appearance, the copy is marked by its difference to a thing; a thing is different from its appearance. For instantiation, the copy is marked by its similarity to a thing, its ‘proximity’ to the Forms. This is heavily evident in Plato’s Sophist but present in Philebus as well.


What’s the problem with a philosophy of similarity? Phallocentrism, which blinds a person to the truth and power that can be found in simulacra. Plato tries to preserve the authority of the Father, the Unparticipated, by making it regulate the relationship between daughter and fiance. Deleuze rejects this authority and goes straight for buggery uh, metaphorically.

It is the divergent that is prior to similarity; difference is permissive and enabling. Through a deconstruction of Platonism the simulacrum are made real, the virtual gains efficacy, and the cost is small, “the most innocent of all destructions, the destruction of Platonism. What does the Platonic subject know of Forms other than his experience of sensibles, such that we could say that he judges truth “objectively” and “in a relation only to the Forms”? Deleuze is giving your exact objection, except he glosses over the question of whether or not Plato’s view is objective and goes directly to demonstrating that Plato’s view is based in bias of similarity over difference, and such bias undermines his goal of objectivity.

I suppose Plato would say that judging things in relation to the Forms is objective because it is not the kind of sensation that encompasses taste and sight, but a kind of sensation that is reliable as long as our own soul is in good shape. We don’t know the Forms through an encounter like sense impressions, an encounter of the new, but rather through an encounter that is like remembering, an encounter of the very old which is distinct.

Struggles With Philosophy: Thoughts on Simulacrum

It seems giles you don’t agree with Plato, but what do you think of Deleuze’s critique? I thought you were offering an objection against Plato. I don’t know how to interpret this gillfs as an objection against Deleuze’s assessment. What did you mean? Your question only prompted me to give Plato’s account of the Forms, and I’m not sure how that alone is clearly an objection to Deleuze, since it doesn’t address Deleuze’s challenges.

Is Deleuze characterizing Plato as saying, in contradiction to some other position, that truth is judged “objectively” and “in relation only to the Forms”? Deleuze sets up the Platonic project as one of confirming the existence of essences. The “thing” is separated from its images, which are what we confront when we believe we are confronting a thing. Plato wants to show that we have direct contact with a thing, not just contact with drleuze image, which is made possible through our soul.

This directness of contact is reliable, unlike divergent subjective ajd. Truth is discovered only in this capacity, in a relation to the Forms, not in a relation to images specifically, simulacra.

But I put all this in the post, so maybe I’m not answering the way you wanted. Could you say, more explicitly than you have, what you are concerned with here? Is it the portrayal of Plato as promoting the possibility of an objective view?

Is the characterization of the Forms off? Is Plato’s view of truth misrepresented? Are you asking me what Plato would say, what I would say, what Deleuze would say, what Deleuze would say Plato would say, deleuae what? I interpreted your term ‘sensibles’ to mean something like qualitative experience through a sense organ. So you’re asking how to distinguishing sensing the Forms from regular sensation for the motivation of distinguishing which one is more reliable and why so. The Platonic subject experiences the Forms through the soul, which senses, but is not fallible like other sensors because it is not finite.


Was this what you were trying to get me to say? Ah, I think I see.

Simulacrum – Wikipedia

Deleuze does not actually trace Plato’s account of the Forms, since he goes directly to the function of oppositions working in Plato’s argument, so the account of the Forms I’ve been giving is my own.

I should have been more rigorous in representing Plato accurately rather than trying to go right to Deleuze’s point. As far as I’ve come to understand, that is how the Platonic subject has an experience of the ideal world other than through his experience of the sensible world.

Does Plato say the individual human soul is an instantiation of the Form of the human soul in general, or is the individual human soul itself a Form of which we are unique instances of? Deleuze does not make that clear, only that the soul qua Form plays the role of the Unparticipated. Now yhe I have clarified the arguments and counterarguments, do you still object to Deleuze’s assessment? I learned this from secondary sources.

I simulacru finished the first three books of the Republic, but that is the extent to which I know Plato directly, so far just started Book IV.

Nothing explicitly about the Forms has been laid out yet. I can cite my secondary source, a philosophy teacher: The ephemeral thing is hardly real, while the Forms of things are the most real because they are never destroyed.

Because humans have souls, which last forever, we have a bit of the true reality in us, and this allows us to know of other things truly, despite the ephemeral nature of appearances.

Ok, but your teacher’s claim here seems tangential to the question at hand. Some good places to look would be Meno 80eb, Pheado 72ee, and Phaedrus bb. I’m not familiar with “Deleuze’s Virtual”, I have only read a few things by him. This essay by Deleuze, however, is in his psychoanalyst phase, before Guattari. Log in No account? Overview of Deleuze’s “Plato and Simulacrum”.


Overview of Deleuze’s “Plato and Simulacrum” anosognosia:: No, I agree with Plato. My objection is against Deleuze’s assessment of him. Virtual I’m not familiar with “Deleuze’s Virtual”, I have only read a few things by him.